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ABSTRACT
In recent years, Belgium and the Netherlands have been confronted with relatively 
many citizens or residents who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join and fight 
with jihadist groups — 388 Belgian and 220 Dutch as estimated by the respective 
authorities. This article provides an overview of the phenomenon of jihadist foreign 
fighters in the Low Countries, analyzing their characteristics, motivations, and roles 
in the war in Syria and Iraq. It compares the Belgian and Dutch cases, focusing on 
key aspects, such as age, sex, and geographical and socioeconomic background.
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Introduction
In recent years, many European countries have been confronted with citizens 
or residents that have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups such as 
Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and Islamic State (IS). The larger European countries, most 
notably France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, have ‘produced’ the highest 
number of these jihadist foreign fighters. But smaller countries have also seen 
high numbers of young Muslims leaving for the battlefields in the Middle East. 
Two of them, Belgium and the Netherlands, have been confronted with relatively 
many of them compared to the size of their populations. Belgium is in fact the 
European country with most of these fighters per capita with 388 confirmed 
cases.1 The Netherlands’ authorities estimate the number of Dutch jihadists in 
Syria and Iraq at 220, including 70 women.2
Why have these two countries produced relatively many jihadists? This 
question is difficult to answer as there are many possible factors that play 
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a role, ranging from national and local political contexts, and the existence 
of networks and leadership, to demographics and individual push and pull 
factors. This article aims to offer a first attempt to shed light on this question 
by providing an overview of the phenomenon of jihadist foreign fighters in 
the two Low Countries, by analyzing their characteristics, motivations, and 
roles in the war in Syria and Iraq, and by comparing the cases of Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Thus, the article contributes to the discussion on the 
topic of foreign fighters which is hampered by a lack of empirical data on 
the phenomenon in general and detailed information on individual cases in 
particular. Linked to this, there are many assumptions regarding European 
foreign jihadist fighters – e.g. they are very young, they are single, mainly of 
migrant background, and part of the lower strata of society — that need to 
be confronted with empirical data.
This study of Dutch and Belgian jihadist foreign fighters is based on media 
reports, governmental documents, court proceedings, media reports, as well 
interviews with key actors in relation to jihadist foreign fighters including 
governmental officials, Syrian refugees, friends and family members of those 
that have left for Syria or Iraq, and a number of active supporters of the vio-
lent jihad. In this article, the term ‘jihadist foreign fighter’ is used to describe 
persons who have joined a fighting group in a foreign conflict with a jihadist 
agenda. The term refers to both Dutch and Belgian citizens and residents of the 
Netherlands and Belgium. The part on the characteristics of these fighters uses 
the methodological framework developed by Mark Sageman3 and is based on 
a dataset consisting of 370 cases (of which 211 are from Belgium and 159 from 
the Netherlands).4
The outline of the article is as follows: First we provide a number of histor-
ical examples of foreign fighters from the Low Countries before focusing on 
cases of jihadist foreign fighters until the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 
2011. Secondly, it looks into key characteristics of these jihadists, such as age, 
sex, and geographical and socioeconomic background. This is followed by an 
attempt to explain why more than 600 men and women from the Netherlands 
and Belgium have joined the jihad in Syria and Iraq. What were their motiva-
tions? In order to answer this question, we focus on push and pull factors that 
have been  mentioned in scholarly and governmental reports. Next the article 
deals with their roles in the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Based on open sources,5 
it describes the process of vetting and training after their arrival, the role of the 
men in the violent conflict, and the specific role of women in territories occupied 
by the organizations IS and JaN. In the final section, we reflect on the limitations 
of this research and arrive at a number of general observations.
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The phenomenon of (jihadist) foreign fighters
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new to the Low Countries. The first 
type of foreign fighters the recently independent state of Belgium and the coun-
try it separated from, the Netherlands, were confronted with were the so-called 
Papal Zouaves. These were Catholic youngsters who gave heed to the call of 
Pope Pius IX to assist him in his struggle against the Italian Unificationists in the 
1860s. Some 1910 Dutch and 686 Belgians left for Rome to fight.6 More than 
half a century later, in the 1930s, some 17007 Belgians and 6508 Dutch joined 
the International Brigades that fought in Spain to help the Republican cause 
against the Nationalists headed by general Franco. During World War II, thou-
sands joined the ranks of the Waffen-SS: between 22,000 and 25,000 Dutch9, 
and 10,000 Flemish speaking Belgians and 6700 Francophone Belgians.10 Such 
high numbers seem to be a thing of the past. In the decades after World War 
II until recently, the phenomenon of foreign fighters had shrunk to just a few 
individuals who joined groups abroad, ranging from Palestinian organizations 
in the Middle East to left-wing groups in Latin america. In the Netherlands, the 
most famous non-jihadist foreign fighter is Tanja Nijmeijer, who got engaged in 
the Fuerzas armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FaRC), and who is currently 
part of the FaRC delegation in the peace talks with the Columbian government 
in the city of Havana, Cuba.11
The phenomenon of jihadi foreign fighters is relatively new. It started at 
the turn of the century when individuals or small groups of friends tried to 
join the violent jihad in places such as Kashmir, afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, 
and Somalia. Some died just after their arrival. Such was the case of two Dutch 
youngsters of Moroccan background who went to India in December 2001 and 
who were killed in the streets of Srinagar in Kashmir, apparently before they 
could make contact with local jihadist groups.12 Many failed to even reach the 
war zones where they wanted to fight. In 2003 two other Dutch youngsters 
were arrested in Ukraine while trying to cross the border with Russia, allegedly 
on their way to Chechnya.13 Some did manage to reach the battlefields and 
join jihadist groups. among them was at least one woman: Muriel Degauque, 
a Belgian convert to Islam who committed a suicide car bomb attack on US 
soldiers in Iraq in December 2005.14 The total number of these ‘early’ jihadist 
foreign fighters was relatively small – perhaps only a dozen who managed to 
join a jihadist group. Hence, until 2012, the authorities in the Low Countries 
were not very worried about the phenomenon of jihadist foreign fighters. It 
was seen as an isolated phenomenon of individuals and small local networks 
mostly characterized by their inactivity and limited size.15 In the fall of 2012, the 
situation changed drastically. Partly as a result of extensive media and Internet 
attention to the conflict in Syria, rather suddenly, dozens of jihadists started to 
travel from the Low Countries to Syria.16
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It took until early 2013 before the authorities publicly sounded the alarm bell. 
In February 2013, the head of the Dutch secret service, the General Intelligence 
and Security Service (aIVD), went on television warning about a rapid growth 
in the number of Dutch youngsters going to Syria to join the armed struggle 
against the regime of Bashar al-assad, among others on the side of JaN, an 
organization linked to al Qaeda. This warning was followed by the quarterly 
Terrorism Threat assessment (DTN) of March 2013,17 which raised the threat 
level from ‘limited’ to ‘substantial’, the second-highest threat level on a scale 
of four. around the same time, the European Union’s judicial cooperation unit 
Eurojust officially confirmed that Belgians were also fighting in Syria. In Belgium 
in 2013, the jihadist foreign fighter phenomenon became front page news, and 
reports and articles on these fighters appeared weekly. Many of these fighters 
were affiliated with a Belgian organization called Sharia4Belgium.18 This organ-
ization has been described as an ‘atypical but extremist Salafist organization’.19 
Sharia4Belgium was founded by Muslim youngsters in antwerp on 3 March 2010 
and was declared a terrorist organization by the antwerp Correctional Tribunal 
in February 2015. Despite its short existence, it contributed significantly to the 
growth of the Belgian jihadist scene20 and may be regarded as an important 
factor in explaining why Belgium has ‘produced’ relatively many jihadist foreign 
fighters.
The growth of the number of these fighters in Belgium was spectacular: from 
about 70 according to the first official estimate in March 2013,21 to 388 according 
to data provided by the Belgian minister of the interior in February 2016.22 In 
the Netherlands it grew from a few dozen in early 2013,23 to an estimated 220 
by early 2016.24
Who are they?
Who are these jihadist fighters from the Low Countries, and what are their char-
acteristics? Using Sageman’s methodological framework, we have looked at a 
number of characteristics that make up the ‘biographies’ of the men and women 
from Belgium and the Netherlands who have joined a jihadist organization in 
Syria or Iraq. The database, consisting of 370 cases, serves as the empirical basis 
for the overview below. In addition, occasionally, we refer to other relevant 
sources that add insight into the question of who these jihadists are.
Geographical origin
The Belgian and Dutch jihadist foreign fighters generally have the nationality 
of, were born in, or resided in Belgium or the Netherlands. Most persons have 
parents who were born in Morocco or were born there themselves (46%), fol-
lowed – at a distance – by persons of Belgian, Dutch, Turkish, Syrian, Russian 
(Chechen), Somali, and algerian extraction (Table 1). other sources speak of an 
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even higher percentage of people of Moroccan descent – up to 80% according 
to the Soufan Group in the case of Belgium.25
Their place of recruitment proved difficult to determine. For those cases for 
which we could find reliable information, it often coincided with the last known 
place of residence. This place of residence could be determined for 122 Dutch 
jihadists. More than 70% of those resided in one of the four main urban agglom-
erations in the Netherlands: amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. 
The majority of them lived in the greater The Hague area, which also includes 
the cities of Delft and Zoetermeer. With regard to the Belgian cases, of which 
we could determine the place of residence for 203 persons, more than 65% 
were from antwerp or Brussels. another significant number of Belgian jihadists 
came from the city of Vilvoorde located in Flanders, just north of Brussels. other 
cities and towns with a sizable group of jihadist foreign fighters include Maaseik, 
Kortrijk, Ghent, and Genk (all located in Flanders), and Liège (the biggest city 
of Wallonia).
Age
The average age of the jihadist foreign fighters is 23.5 years old (Table 2). Their 
statistical distribution is very spread out: the youngest person was only 13 years 
old when he left, while the oldest was already 67. Most of them are not (late) 
adolescents, but young adults, being in their early or mid-twenties. The female 
jihadists in the sample are on average younger than their male counterparts.26 
among them are several underage jihadi-brides who joined their (future) spouse 
in Syria or Iraq.
Regarding age, Belgian and Dutch jihadists differ from other groups of jihad-
ists from the past, as studied by Sageman and Bakker. Their studies show that 
most persons who joined the jihad in the period between the 1990s and 2009 
did so while being well past adolescence. The average age in the study of global 
Salafi jihadists by Sageman is 25.7.27 That of homegrown jihadists in Europe, 







Parents born in morocco 
or born there 
themselves
41% 50% 46%
Parents born in Turkey or 
born there themselves
13% 5% 8%
Table 2. average age (measured at the time of departure).
Dutch jihadists (N = 82) Belgian jihadists (N = 85) Total sample (N = 167)
average age 23.2 23.8 23.5
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studied by Bakker, was 27.3.28 Furthermore, their findings show that the average 
age of joining the jihad increased during these two decades.29
Sex
of the 370 cases of Belgian and Dutch jihadists in the dataset, 81% are male. 
although in both countries the majority is male, the share of females is a lot 
higher in the Netherlands (Table 3). This difference is also noted in other sources. 
For instance, Van ostaeyen claims females represent less than 10% of the group 
of Belgian jihadists, while aIVD figures state that one in three Dutch jihadists 
is female.30
a high proportion of males among jihadists is also found by both Sageman 
and Bakker.31 However, the number of females among the jihadist foreign fight-
ers is considerably higher than in the aforementioned studies of jihadists in the 
past. It should also be noted that nearly all of those that have been reported to 
have died in Syria and Iraq are male.32
Faith
approximately half of the jihadists were raised as Muslims. Some were raised 
in orthodox families. of the cases for which we could find reliable information 
on their faith as youth, many were not strict observers of all traditions and 
obligations. The dataset of Belgian and Dutch jihadists also shows that 6% of 
the persons converted to Islam before traveling to Syria or Iraq. This number 
reflects official figures as provided by the oCaD, which also speak of 6% being 
converts.33 according to van San, most of these Dutch and Belgian converts 
are women.34
of the jihadists for which information could be collected on religious devo-
tion prior to traveling to Syria or Iraq, most of them showed signs of intensifica-
tion of religious beliefs. This manifested itself in for instance wearing traditional 
clothes, increased visits to mosques or praying, and/or increased interest in the 
study of religious texts. Similar manifestations of more intense religious devotion 
were found by Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol who, for instance, observed stricter 








male–female ratio 76–24 84–16 81–19
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Socioeconomic background and education
The data on the socioeconomic status of the families of the Belgian and Dutch 
jihadists indicate that they almost exclusively stem from the lower and middle 
strata of society (Table 4). The distributions among the three classes in society 
somewhat differs between the two groups. In the case of the Netherlands, the 
majority are of lower class origin (67%) and a minority from middle class back-
ground (33%). In the case of Belgium, the jihadists are evenly spread over these 
two classes (47%) and a small minority is of upper class origin (6%).
Regarding education, some of the jihadists had only finished primary edu-
cation. For others, a high school diploma was the highest achieved degree. 
Relatively many had at least vocational training, and a few had followed edu-
cation at a higher level (together they represent 47%). of this group, however, 
most did not finish their education. Some dropped out just before traveling 
to Syria or Iraq – either as the result of bad grades, bad behavior, or by their 
own decision. others were still enrolled at the time of their departure. others 
were too young to have either vocational or higher educational experience. 
This explains the relatively low level of those that finished education beyond 
the level of high school. according to Coolsaet, in Belgium, only a small minority 
held a college degree.36
Regarding occupational status, of those for which we could find reliable 
information, many were unemployed (Table 5). of those that were employed, 
their occupational status was mainly within the category unskilled worker.37 
There were also a few within the category of professionals.38 a few jihadists, 
both among the Belgian ones and the Dutch, were known to have served in 
the military before joining the jihad. Many were students at the time they left 
for Syria and Iraq.
Finally, data on relative deprivation proved difficult to collect. Signs of eco-
nomic, social, and/or political deprivation have nonetheless been identified in 
6% of the cases in the database – comparable with Bakker’s findings.39
Table 4. Background.
Dutch jihadists (N = 30) Belgian jihadists (N = 15) Total sample 
(N = 45)
lower class origin 67% 47% 60%
middle class origin 33% 47% 38%
upper class origin 0% 6% 2%
Table 5. Occupational status.
Dutch jihadists (N = 32) Belgian jihadists (N = 34) Total sample (N = 66)
employed 21% 27% 25%
unemployed 41% 32% 36%
Student 38% 41% 39%
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Psychological make-up
In his study of the psychological make-up of 140 Dutch jihadists, Weenink 
showed that 60% of them had psychological problems.40 Using a very wide 
definition of such problems, he found problems as diverse as a ‘problematic 
social setting’, petty and serious criminal offenses, and diagnosed mental health 
issues. The latter is found in almost 9% of the sample. This is a lot higher than 
the data in our sample – using a narrower definition — that suggest that 2% of 
the Dutch and Belgian jihadists had some sort of psychological disorder before 
traveling to Syria. These disorders include feeble-mindedness, attention defi-
cit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, and claustrophobia. This 2% is in line 
with earlier findings by both Sageman and Bakker.41 However, according to 
Coolsaet, the foreign fighters ‘yearning to place themselves at the centre of 
events [. . .] reflects a degree of narcissism that was largely absent among their 
older predecessors’.42
Regarding criminality, based on our data, roughly 20% of the Belgian and 
Dutch jihadists has been suspected of criminal activity prior to departure. In 
the case of Belgium, a distinction should be made between the first group 
of jihadists that left for Syria and later groups. The first group was composed 
mainly of members from pre-existing networks, mainly Sharia4Belgium which 
was regarded as a terrorist organization by a Correctional Tribunal in antwerp 
in 2015.43 according to Coolsaet, whereas most individuals of the first group 
were known to the police (partly because of their link to Sharia4Belgium or 
because of ordinary crimes), this was less so for those that followed the first 
wave. Those that left at a later stage ‘showed no signs of deviant behavior and 
nothing seemed to distinguish them from their peers’.44
Social affiliation
Most of the jihadists for which information on marital status could be collected 
were married,45 despite being relatively young – on average 23.5, including 
quite a few teenagers. among Belgian jihadists, 78% were married, compared 
to 64% among the Dutch (Table 6). This might be explained by the fact that, on 
average, the Dutch were a bit younger than their Belgian counterparts. among 
the married were also women who went together with their husbands or joined 
them later on.
In many instances, the jihadist foreign fighters were closely connected to 
one another by way of family bonds and/or friendships. The latter category 
includes both larger groups – sometimes networks of radicals — and smaller 
Table 6. marital status.
Dutch jihadists (N = 50) Belgian jihadists (N = 37) Total sample (N = 87)
married 64% 78% 70%
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groups of two or a few friends. Such pre-existing social affiliations often seem to 
have played an important role in (collective) recruitment – as will be discussed 
in the next section.
Why did they go?
What has caused more than 600 men and women from Belgium and the 
Netherlands to join the jihad in Syria and Iraq? There seem to be many factors 
that play a role, which can be divided into push and pull factors. In addition, 
propaganda and recruitment that stress both types of factors also seem to have 
contributed to the growth of this phenomenon. Moreover, the first jihadists 
with combat experience that returned to the Low Countries also seem to form 
a source of inspiration for potential fighters.
Push factors
as mentioned in the previous section, many of the Belgian and Dutch jihadists 
are part of the lower strata of society and have relatively low levels of education 
(which is partly related to their young age). However, jihadists do not solely 
stem from the lower socioeconomic strata of society, nor are they all poorly 
educated. Therefore, socioeconomic characteristics alone do not explain the 
phenomenon of jihadist foreign fighters. There are however factors that are 
partly linked to these characteristics that seem to hold more explanatory value. 
Research on Dutch jihadist foreign fighters showed that many of the jihadists 
grew up in deprived neighborhoods, that they had difficulties at school or at 
work, confrontations with the authorities, traumatic experiences, and (the per-
ception of ) being confronted with all kinds of injustice.46 against this backdrop, 
some of the Dutch jihadists showed strong frustrations about their own societal 
position in the Netherlands or that of their ethnic group.47 Some of them also 
showed feelings of apathy and a lack of meaningfulness in their lives prior to 
traveling to Syria. as a consequence, some persons no longer felt they had a 
future in the Netherlands.48 This also seems to be the case for the Belgian jihad-
ists. according to Coolsaet,
one cannot fail to notice how frequently [the Belgian jihadists] refer to the absence 
of a future, to personal difficulties that have to be coped with in everyday life. 
often these stories point to a desire to leave all this behind, to be ‘someone’, to 
be accepted.49
Coolsaet also stresses the importance of feelings of injustice and discrimination 
as the decision to join the jihad in Syria seems to a large extent found in how 
one feels.50 Such feelings also played a role in the Netherlands, and not only 
for those on the fringes of society. Based on her research on Dutch and Belgian 
jihadist foreign fighters, Van San states that those that are well integrated raise 
their societal expectations, and consequently are more susceptible to social 
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exclusion and (perceived) discrimination.51 Such feelings seem to be strongly 
felt among those from Moroccan families.52 For others, leaving the Netherlands 
or Belgium presented an opportunity to break with their criminal, corrupted, 
Western lifestyle. In some cases, this meant escaping prison sentences or debts. 
In other instances, it meant leaving a place where nothing really happened, in 
pursuit of excitement.53
Pull factors
Jihadist foreign fighters are not only persons who leave their place of residence, 
but are, perhaps first and foremost, persons who go to a certain place abroad 
to fight. In the case of Syria, especially during the early stages of the conflict, 
(images of ) the brutality committed by the al-assad regime in combination with 
the ‘international paralysis’54 served as an important justification to pick up arms 
against the Syrian regime.55 Extensive media coverage of the Syrian conflict also 
played a role.56 according to the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism (NCTV), Sunni Muslims increasingly came to see the regime 
of Bashar al-assad as representing an infidel sect that brutally repressed the 
majority Sunni population.57 In Belgium, this narrative was propagated by 
Sharia4Belgium and like-minded groups.58 In the Netherlands it was propa-
gated by groups like Behind Bars/Street Dawa, Sharia4Holland, and the ‘Context 
group’.59 as the war progressed, the religious and sectarian aspect became the 
dominant narrative. The rise of jihadist groups and the conflicts between these 
and other groups further contributed to the chaos and bloodshed in the coun-
try. To some, this infighting meant that they could no longer identify with the 
battle fought in Syria and hence they decided not to travel abroad.60 For many 
others, the rapid ascent of ISIS, the establishment of the caliphate, and the 
impression of unstoppable expansion boosted the appeal to join the jihad.61 
according to Bakker and Grol, among the Dutch jihadists there is a strong – often 
persistent – conviction that traveling to Syria is the right thing to do, now or in 
the future. This conviction can be based on ideals or on specific personal needs 
and desires, and it is often a mixture of both.62 among the personal factors that 
contribute to the appeal of joining the violent jihad are the need for a sense of 
belonging, fraternity and comradeship, respect, recognition, acceptance by a 
group, identity, adventure, heroism. Factors of a more religious and ideological 
nature include the appeal of living under strict Islamic law, contributing to an 
ideal state, and that of martyrdom.63 In particular, living under Islamic law in the 
self-proclaimed caliphate of ISIS seemed an important motivation for a number 
of Dutch jihadists that were studied by Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol.64 Some 
regard migrating to the caliphate as a religious obligation – referred to as hijrah. 
It is however important to stress that the role of religion and the extent to which 
persons see the idea of joining the jihad as a religious duty is difficult to assess. 
according to a French judge specializing in terrorism cases, 90% of the jihadists 
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traveled to Syria because of various personal motives, and only 10% did so out 
of religious beliefs.65 Still, as noted earlier, many Belgian and Dutch jihadists 
showed an increased interest in religion in the period before they left for Syria 
or Iraq. These people proved to be susceptible to the idea of the violent jihad 
and that of organizations such as JaN and ISIS. another religious pull factor is 
the apocalyptic vision that the Syrian conflict heralds the end of the world as 
foretold in seventh-century prophecies.66
These ‘attractions’ of the jihad in Syria and Iraq are propagated by various 
jihadist groups, both in the two countries and outside the region. according to 
Hegghammer, Syria is probably the most ‘socially mediated’ conflict in modern 
history.67 In particular, ISIS seems to have been successful in propagating the 
‘caliphate narrative’.68 It also managed to present a ‘romantic’ idea of the cali-
phate as well as of the jihadist battlefield.69 For instance, al-Baghdadi’s call to 
those with certain specific occupations (e.g. doctors and technicians) to join 
ISIS suggests employment opportunities of a supportive nature. Furthermore, 
jihadist parties are in control of large areas in Syria, which suggests that it is 
possible to take part in the jihad while to some extent avoiding both combat 
and deadly enemy raids.70 This has made joining the violent jihad in Syria and 
Iraq attractive for an unusually diverse group of people when compared to the 
situation in the past.71 These dynamics might help explain the diversity within 
the group of Belgian and Dutch jihadists, which consists of both very young and 
very old persons, of male and female jihadists, and even families with children.
Social dynamics
Many of the Dutch and Belgian jihadists that have traveled to Syria had contact 
with ideologically like-minded people in person, via the Internet, and/or via 
social media. as noted in the previous section, many of them were connected 
through friendship, kinship, or both. During the early stages of the Syrian con-
flict, a number of jihadist networks also played an important role, enhancing 
the push and pull factors and bringing them together, in particular in Belgium.72 
Their role seems quite clear as the main places of residence of the Belgian and 
Dutch jihadists to a large extent coincide with the presence of these networks 
in these towns and urban regions. In many cases, these organizations did not 
shy away from the public spotlight. They openly promoted their jihadist and 
anti-democratic views. among these groups were inspiring or charismatic fig-
ures or ‘facilitators’ who managed to underline the push factors and strengthen 
the ‘attractiveness’ of the jihad in Syria.73 Furthermore, through social dynamics 
such as group think and peer pressure, those that participated in these networks 
were conditioned to go on jihad.74 These organizations seem to have played a 
decisive role in the case of Belgium. according to the head of the Belgian State 
Security Service (VSSE), Sharia4Belgium can be considered as the main incu-
bator of departures.75 This organization also had an impact in the Netherlands. 
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according to the aIVD, the first wave of jihadist departures from the Netherlands 
to Syria ‘was probably attributable to the close contacts between Behind Bars/
Street Dawah and Sharia4Belgium. Individuals associated with the two move-
ments were at the heart of that sudden exodus.’76
another important social dynamic is ‘chain migration’ or peer recruitment. 
This dynamic has been observed by both Belgian and Dutch authorities.77 Most 
of those who decided to travel to the Syria or Iraq already know someone inside 
territory controlled by ISIS: family, friends from their old neighborhood, friends 
with whom they played soccer together, former classmates, etc.78 often, the 
would-be jihadists are persuaded to come by those that are already there.79 
Concrete examples of this form of peer recruitment are the departures of rela-
tively large groups of friends from the Dutch cities of Delft and The Hague and 
the Belgian city of Vilvoorde who left for Syria and Iraq in different waves.
What do they do out there?
Belgian and Dutch jihadists travel to Syria and Iraq mainly through Turkey, usu-
ally via the Turkish province of Hatay.80 after crossing the Turkish–Syrian border, 
the foreigners are picked up by a contact and taken to a safe house. The jihadist 
groups operate safe houses for specific groups of foreigners, based on a com-
mon language. The Belgian (Flemish) and Dutch jihadists are often accommo-
dated at the same location.81 There, the men and women will be separated, and 
possessions will be confiscated and searched for chips and GPS equipment.82 
For a period of approximately two or three weeks, the new recruits will be inter-
rogated and closely monitored to identify possible spies.83
after this interrogation phase, the men will undergo several training courses 
at a training camp. This separation between time spent at a safe house and time 
spent at a training facility may vary. at times, interrogation and training seem 
to happen rather simultaneously. The entire ‘preparatory phase’ (i.e. inquiries 
as well as training) seems to take two or three months on average.84 Training 
includes lessons in the arabic language, religion, and military training.85 The 
latter covers training to improve one’s physique, to cope with hunger and cold, 
to learn how to use various weapons (mainly the Kalashnikov, rocket propelled 
grenades, and hand grenades), and to become familiar with combat techniques 
and strategies.86 Usually before taking part in this military training, new recruits 
need to swear an oath of allegiance (bay’ah). This pledge of allegiance occurs 
before entering the ranks of either ISIS87 or JaN,88 and entails that one will com-
ply with the assigned duties, regardless whether one agrees or disagrees with 
the given tasks. While in training, the recruits are generally not send to the 
frontlines, yet they can be assigned with guard duties (ribat). This serves as a 
first practical experience in being part of an army and taking part in an armed 
struggle.
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after the training phase, recruits will, in principle, be deployed on the basis of 
their competences and wishes, and will be prepared accordingly.89 Most recruits 
can choose between becoming a fighter, committing a suicide attack, or fulfill-
ing certain supporting activities.90 The options for the latter seem diverse, and 
include jobs as an engineer, a hacker, a doctor, an administrative worker, a cook, 
a driver, or a job at the religious police or a Sharia court.91
The Dutch jihadists generally appear to choose the life of a fighter.92 Similarly, 
most Belgian jihadists can be found at all the ISIS fronts.93 after completing the 
training courses, the foreign fighters will be assigned to a battalion under the 
command of an emir. These battalions seem, like the safe houses, to be organized 
on the basis of a shared language. Hence, Belgian (Flemish) and Dutch jihadist 
fighters are often within the same ‘battalion’. These battalions are not contin-
uously engaged in combat. a considerable amount of time at the front lines 
is spent on other armed tasks, such as guarding checkpoints and patrolling.94 
Moreover, as in all armies, periods at the front lines are alternated with duties in 
the hinterland, including performing tasks in pursuit of the jihadist cause, such 
as guard duty or dawah (i.e. inviting others to Islam through dialog).95
The salary of the jihadists from Western countries varies between $300 and 
$800 per month.96 other ‘benefits’ of being a soldier can include war loot and 
female slaves.97 according to the aIVD, when ISIS conquers a village or area, it 
is not unusual that its members – whether ordered to do so or not – resort to 
torture and rape.98 The extent to which Dutch and Belgian jihadists are involved 
in these or other war crimes is difficult to tell. There is a video of Dutch-speaking 
jihadists who take part in a beheading.99 others have committed suicide attacks 
against civilian targets. Those that do not have a role as a soldier are primarily 
tasked with supporting activities. For instance, a Dutch boy told his parents 
that he was a cook,100 and a Belgian jihadist is assumed to be in charge of the 
religious police (al-Hisbah) in Raqqa.101 Such supporting activities are nonethe-
less often difficult to see separately from the violent jihad. Violence seems to be 
inherent to certain supporting jobs. For instance, this is the case with al-Hisbah 
agents, who are engaged in addressing, arresting, and punishing those who 
have violated the rules of ISIS. The boundaries between a violent and non-vio-
lent role are also blurred by the fact that almost all men receive a rifle (usually a 
Kalashnikov) and are expected to be armed.102 Finally, as new recruits need to 
swear an oath of allegiance to the jihadist organization that they have joined, 
they can – regardless of their assigned role – be called upon to engage in com-
bat or in other violent activities. Everyone who has sworn this oath and is not 
primarily a fighter is thus in fact a reservist. Young boys, viewed as the fighters 
of the future, are prepared for this role from an early age. The doctrine of ISIS is 
taught at schools, and the necessary weapon and combat skills are practiced 
at training camps for boys.103
among the Dutch and Belgian jihadists are persons that hold relatively 
important positions.104 There are indications that some have risen to the rank 
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of emir, i.e. commander of a unit. others are believed to hold high supportive 
positions, such as the earlier mentioned al-Hisbah example, or play a focal role 
in spreading propaganda for ISIS or other jihadist groups.
The life of women is rather different than that of men. Their primary role is 
to quickly marry, raise children, and to obey their husband. They serve society 
from behind the scenes, in principle being only able to leave the vicinity of their 
house while being veiled and in the company of a male relative.105 The Belgian 
and Dutch wives in Raqqa often visit each other when their husbands are away 
during the day.106 They have only a few options to regain some of the liberties 
they lost after joining ISIS. as education and health care is separated according 
to gender, some female jihadists are teachers and nurses.107 Women can also 
join the ranks of the all-female religious police unit: the al-Khansaa brigade. This 
brigade controls the adherence of women to moral conduct according to ISIS 
standards. Like the al-Hisbah, it has the mandate to enforce ISIS’s rules and to 
punish those that disobey the rules, among other sanctions using whipping.108 
Al-Khansaa agents are armed, yet women in general – in contrast to male jihad-
ists – do not receive a weapon. They do however have the opportunity to arm 
themselves, and many allegedly carry a firearm in their purses.109 Many ISIS 
women also play an important role in ISIS propaganda and are active in recruit-
ing other women.110 It should be noted that Dutch jihadists seem more often 
than their Belgian peers to have been involved in disseminating propaganda 
to a targeted audience or a wide public.111
General observations
above, we have provided an overview of the characteristics, motivations, and 
roles of Belgian and Dutch jihadists that have left for Syria and Iraq. It is based on 
data that we gathered for just over half of the total amount of cases as estimated 
by the Dutch and Belgian authorities. Hence, it does not provide a complete 
overview. Moreover, the N is relatively small, which also limits the possibility of 
making generalizations regarding this phenomenon. against this backdrop, and 
stressing the need for more research, we would like to conclude this article with 
a number of preliminary general observations.
First of all, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new to Belgium and 
the Netherlands. That of jihadist foreign fighters, however, is relatively novel, 
although both countries saw examples before 2012. Both Belgium and the 
Netherlands experienced a rapid growth of jihadists starting late 2012 and 
early 2013.
Second, many of the general assumptions regarding European foreign 
jihadist fighters are more or less supported by the data collected on Dutch 
and Belgian fighters. They are indeed relatively young (23.5), though not (late) 
adolescents, but rather young adults. They are mainly of migrant background 
(46% have parents born in Morocco) and are part of the lower strata of society 
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(60%). Despite their relatively young age, a surprisingly high number are not 
single, but married (70%), or even married with children. according to figures 
of the aIVD, there are about 70 Dutch children in ISIS-controlled territories.
Comparing Dutch and Belgian jihadists, we see that the two samples are 
very similar when looking at the following characteristics: geographical origin, 
age, education, and occupational status. When looking at the motivations to 
join the jihad, we note that both groups are believed to have done so for a wide 
variety of reasons ranging from a lack of meaningfulness to social exclusion and 
(perceived) discrimination. Their activities and roles in the conflict in Syria and 
Iraq are also very similar for Dutch and Belgian jihadists.
Dutch and Belgian jihadists differ when looking at the size of the phenom-
enon (Belgium ‘producing’ almost twice the number of jihadist foreign fighters 
compared to the Netherlands) as well as the percentage of women, which is a 
lot higher among the Dutch. They also differ somewhat when looking at mar-
ital status (78% of the Belgians are married compared to 64% of the Dutch) 
and socioeconomic background (that of the Belgian fighters being higher than 
that of the Dutch). Regarding motivations to leave for Syria and Iraq, the role of 
networks in propagating the jihad has been more important in Belgium than 
in the Netherlands.
These empirical data and the comparison between the jihadists from Belgium 
and the Netherlands provide more insight in the who, why, and what questions 
surrounding the phenomenon of jihadism in Europe. Comparison with other 
countries is needed to be able to explain why some countries have ‘produced’ 
more jihadists than others and what factors may be more important than oth-
ers in explaining the characteristics and development of the phenomenon in 
general. To that end, we should not only focus on other European countries, 
but also non-European countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi arabia 
from which thousands have left for the battlefields in Syria and Iraq and whose 
citizens fight alongside their jihadist comrades from Europe.
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